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Implementable Quantum Bit-String Commitment Protocol
Toyohiro Tsurumaru
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation,
Information Technology R&D Center
5–1–1 Ofuna, Kamakura-shi,
Kanagawa, 247-8501, Japan
Quantum bit string commitment[A.Kent, Phys.Rev.Lett., 90, 237901 (2003)] or QBSC is a variant
of bit commitment (BC). In this paper, we propose a new QBSC protocol that can be implemented
using currently available technology, and prove its security under the same security criteria as
discussed by Kent. QBSC is a generalization of BC, but has slightly weaker requirements, and our
proposed protocol is not intended to break the no-go theorem of quantum BC.
PACS number(s): 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd, 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum bit string commitment (QBSC) was pro-
posed by Kent[3], as a generalization of bit commitment
(BC). The fundamental goal of QBSC is the same as that
of BC; that is, the sender first sends evidence of assigned
data over a communication channel without revealing the
actual data. Then, after an interval, the sender reveals
the data and the receiver verifies that the data have not
been modified.
The difference in QBSC is that the sender commits a
string A = (a1, · · · , an) with n > 1 in a single protocol
session, and a limited (but certain) number of its bits are
accessible by the receiver before the open phase. This
situation is referred to as (m,n) bit string commitment
in Ref.[3], where m (≤ n) is the maximum number of
accessible bits. Conventional BC schemes correspond to
the case where n = 1 and m = 0, and in this sense QBSC
is a generalization of BC.
In this paper, we propose a new QBSC protocol that
can be implemented using currently available technology,
such as single-photon sources and detectors, and then
prove its security. The main difference from the previ-
ous protocol is in the quantum measurement procedure
performed by the receiver to verify a commitment. In
our scheme, the receiver is allowed to perform the mea-
surements in the commitment phase using randomized
bases, which means that it is not necessary to preserve
the quantum state until the open phase.
Although QBSC is a generalization of BC, the security
level that it achieves is slightly weaker than that of BC
unless m = 0. We would like to stress that our proposal
is not intended to break the no-go theorem of Lo-Chau[5]
and Mayers[6], which states that if one takes full advan-
tage of quantum computers and quantum communication
channels, any type of nonrelativistic BC scheme can be
attacked[17]. Our ultimate goal is to devise useful and
secure quantum cryptographic schemes that do not rely
on BC.
The no-go theorem of BC often makes people think
that it might be impossible to create any useful crypto-
graphic protocols based on quantum theory, except quan-
tum key distribution (QKD). This is mainly because BC
is one important building block in a whole list of interest-
ing tools, such as multi-party protocols or zero-knowledge
proof, rooted in classical cryptology (see e.g., Ref.[8][9]).
However, as pointed out in Ref.[3], we are not yet able
even to characterize the range of cryptographic tasks for
which perfectly secure quantum protocols might possibly
exist. Thus, we assume here that there must be distinct
security notions that are unique to quantum cryptogra-
phy, and seek protocols that do not necessarily have a
classical counterpart.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
briefly review some of the results by Kent[3], including
the basic structure of QBSC and its security criteria.
Subsequently, we describe the proposed protocol in Sec-
tion III and prove its security in Section IV. Then in
Section V, we briefly comment on the implementation
and finally conclude in Section VI.
II. PREVIOUS METHOD
The original QBSC was proposed in Ref.[3], with two
example schemes, called Protocol 1 and Protocol 2. Be-
fore presenting our protocol, we briefly review the results
by Kent in this section. Both of the example protocols
share a simple basic structure, as follows. Throughout
this paper, we will call the sender Alice and the receiver
Bob.
A. Basic Structure of Kent’s Scheme
1. Procedure
Alice and Bob proceed as follows.
Commitment Phase
1. Alice chooses a bit string A = (a1, . . . , an) to be
committed to and sends Bob the corresponding
state |ΨA〉.
22. Bob preserves the received state |ΨA〉.
Open Phase
1. Alice unveils A to Bob.
2. Bob verifies A by a projective measurement on
|ΨA〉. If the outcome is consistent with A, he ac-
cepts the commitment, otherwise he rejects it.
The exact form of the state |ΨA〉 differs depending on
the type of protocol and will be given below.
2. Security Requirement
For BC, there are two security requirements, which are
called the concealing and binding conditions[9]. Similar
notions are also used for QBSC, although with somewhat
relaxed restrictions[3].
- Concealing Condition. The receiver can access
only a limited number of bits in the committed
string A before the open phase.
The number of accessible bits is referred to as m in
Ref.[3].
- Binding Condition. It is unlikely that Alice will
change the content of her commitment A after the
commitment phase.
Note that for BC schemes, Bob is assumed to gain no
information whatsoever regarding committed bit b until
Alice unveils it, whereas in QBSC perfect concealment is
dispensed with; Bob is allowed to extract a certain but
limited amount of information from A.
The meaning of the term ‘unlikely’ in the definition of
the binding condition differs in the two protocols. This
point will be discussed below.
As to the possibility of each player cheating, Alice
cheating puts the binding at risk and Bob cheating corre-
sponds to concealment. Throughout this paper, we con-
sider only cases where either one of them is cheating, but
not both. Thus, the binding and concealing conditions
can be discussed separately.
3. Measurement by Bob
When considering Alice’s cheating, we denote the
quantum state sent to Bob as a density matrix ρ, since in
general, Alice would be likely to use a randomized strat-
egy or send an entangled state. Note here that whatever
strategy Alice follows, once she transmits the quantum
state to Bob, the density matrix ρ is fixed. Honest Bob
verifies Alice’s commitment by performing a projective
measurement of ρ using an orthonormal basis that in-
cludes |ΨA〉. Bob then accepts it as a correct commit-
ment of string A with the probability
Pr[A|ρ] = 〈ΨA|ρ|ΨA〉 . (1)
B. Example Protocols
1. Protocol 1
Define qubit states
ψ0 = |0〉, ψ1 = sin θ|0〉+ cos θ|1〉 .
Alice sends particles in the states ψa1 , . . . , ψan for A =
(a1, . . . , an), ai ∈ {0, 1}. In other words, she transmits
to Bob the state |ΨA〉 := |ψa1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψan〉. Here θ ∈ R
is a constant that is determined according to the security
parameter.
a. Concealing Condition From the Holevo bound[7],
the information m that is accessible by Bob is bounded
by
m ≤ S(ρ) =
[
H2
(
1 + sin θ
2
)]n
, (2)
where H2(x) = −x log x − (1 − x) log(1 − x). Hence m
can be arbitrarily small by adjusting θ.
b. Binding Condition. In Protocol 1, binding is dis-
cussed for each bit separately. Let pji = 〈ψj |ρi|ψj〉 be the
probability of Bob accepting a revelation of j for the ith
bit. We have
p0i + p
1
i ≤ cos2[(π − 2θ)/4] + sin2[(π + 2θ)/4] , (3)
where the RHS can again be chosen arbitrarily close to
1 by choosing suitable θ. In general, the smaller θ is, the
stronger the binding becomes; simultaneously, however,
concealing becomes weaker, as can be seen from Inequal-
ity (2). Thus, θ needs to be chosen with this balance in
mind.
2. Protocol 2
In Protocol 1, as m in (3) is in the same order as
n, most bits from A are accessible by Bob, because the
amount of data encoded per qubit is rather small. Thus,
another protocol at the other extreme with a much higher
encoding rate is considered here .
The basic idea here is that instead of using qubits,
one encodes A into a general D-dimensional vector space
HD = CD/C. Thus, one chooses O (exp(const.D)) states
{|ΨA〉} out of HD.
a. Binding Condition. In Protocol 1, we discussed
bitwise security; here we take a different approach.
Definition 1 Take an arbitrary value of r ∈ Z and ε ∈ R
(ε, r > 0). A QBSC protocol is binding if, by choosing
a large enough n, the following inequality holds for arbi-
trarily chosen A1, . . . , Ar and ρ,∑
i
Pr[Ai|ρ] ≤ 1 + ε . (4)
Here, n is the length of the bit string that is to be com-
mitted. ✷
3Intuitively, this definition can be illustrated as follows.
A cheating Alice might want to postpone her decision
by selecting x patterns of bit strings A1, . . . , Ax in the
commitment phase. Then, later in the open phase, she
could unveil any desired string among them. In such a
case, the maximum probability of her success is less than
1/x if x < r, and is less than 1/r if x > r.
In fact, it can be shown[3] that if the committed states
|ΨA〉 are chosen to be approximately orthogonal:
|〈ΨA|ΨA′〉| ≤ sin θ = ǫ ≪ 1 for ∀A 6= ∀A′ (5)
the above binding condition (4) is true for ε ≤ (r − 1)ǫ.
That is, if one can construct approximately orthogonal
states |ΨA〉, the binding condition is automatically guar-
anteed.
b. Approximately Orthogonal States. In this proto-
col, one needs to choose exp(const.D) states |ΨA〉 out of
D-dimensional vector space while keeping approximate
orthogonality as in (5). Although this seems impossi-
ble at first sight, interestingly, it can in fact be eas-
ily achieved by using classical error-correcting codes[11].
One example is as follows.
Take an error-correcting code E : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m
with information rate R = n/m and minimum distance
d and let δ = d/m. Next choose quantum states |hA〉 ∈
C2m/C corresponding to string A ∈ {0, 1}n as:
|hA〉 := 1√
m
m∑
i=1
|i〉 ⊗ |Ei(A)〉 . (6)
Then, as |〈hA|hA′〉| ≤ (1 − δ) for A 6= A′, an arbitrarily
small ǫ can be chosen by defining |ΨA〉 as |ΨA〉 := |hA〉⊗
· · · ⊗ |hA〉.
III. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
The protocols described in the previous section are cer-
tainly significant, in that they achieve a completely new
type of security by using quantum mechanics. However,
it seems almost impossible to implement them using cur-
rent technology. There are two main reasons.
1. Bob needs to preserve the quantum state |ΨA〉 as
it was created by Alice, until the open phase.
2. In Protocol 2, highly entangled states, such as |hA〉
given in (6), are necessary.
In particular, the first point seems the more difficult to
overcome. Thus, we propose a modified version of QBSC
that can be implemented, and subsequently prove its se-
curity.
In Kent’s protocol, Bob needs to preserve the quan-
tum state ρ as it was sent from Alice in the commitment
phase until the open phase. This is because Bob verifies
ρ by projective measurements using an orthonormal ba-
sis including |ΨA〉〈ΨA|, after Alice has unveiled string A.
Therefore, we cosider here whether Bob can distinguish
ρ sufficiently accurately without knowing A, because if
that is the case, Bob does not need to preserve ρ for a
long period.
In order to actually do this, we change Bob’s verifica-
tion procedure. That is, Bob measures ρ as soon as he
receives it using randomly chosen orthogonal bases, and
then stores the result until the open phase. Although
much less information is obtained in this way than is
obtained by directly comparing ρ with |ΨA〉〈ΨA|, it is
enough to detect cheating by Alice, as we will show in
Section IV.
A. Quantum State for Encoding
First we define the quantum state |ΨA〉, which is used
as a commitment of the string A.
1. Error-Correcting Code
Throughout this section, we assume that string A is
not necessarily a bit string but is in general a q-ary string
A = (a1, . . . , an′), ai ∈ {0, . . . , q−1}. If the original data
are a bit string, one needs to transform them into a q-
ary string using some appropriate surjective mapping. In
this case, A stands for the data of n = ⌈n′ log2 q⌉ bits.
Then we fix a q-ary classical (N,n′, d) error-correcting
code :
E : A 7→ E(A) = (e1, . . . , eN ) , ei ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1} .
The sender stretches the string A into a q-ary string E
of length N using this error-correcting code.
2. Quantum States of ‘Particles’
The commitment |ΨA〉 takes the form
|ΨA〉 = |ΨE(A)〉 := |e1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |eN 〉 , (7)
where each |ei〉 is a D-dimensional vector. That is, the
sender commits by sending N ‘particles’ having inter-
nal degrees of freedom in a D-dimensional vector space
HD = CD/C. Each q-ary value ei is encoded into this
D-dimensional space of the ith particle.
We use the same set of D-dimensional states for each
particle and denote them as
|0〉, · · · , |q − 1〉 ∈ HD . (8)
Hence, Eqn.(7) means that the ith particle has e thi states
of (8). The q states of (8) are all distinct but do not
necessarily form an orthonormal basis.
It is assumed here that D satisfies q = lD for l ∈ Z,
and that the states of (8) can be grouped together into l
types of orthonormal basis M(i), i = 0, . . . , l − 1
M(i) := {|i; 0〉, . . . , |i;D − 1〉}, 〈i; j|i; k〉 = δjk (9)
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FIG. 1: Differences between the previous and proposed protocols.
with
|iD + j〉 = |i; j〉 .
Also, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that the or-
thogonal bases M(i) are symmetric under a finite group
G that acts on HD. In other words, for any 0 ≤ i ≤ l−1,
g ∈ G, there exists 0 ≤ i′ ≤ l − 1 satisfying
gM(i) := {R(g)|i; 0〉, . . . , R(g)|i;D − 1〉} =M(i′) ,
(10)
where R is a representation of G in HD. In Eqn.(10),
states are identified if they differ only up to a phase of
complex number.
B. Protocol
Alice and Bob proceed as follows.
Commitment Phase
1. Alice chooses a q-ary string A = (a1, . . . , an′) to
which she is committed and computes the corre-
sponding codeword E(A) = (e1, . . . , eN ).
2. Bob chooses a l-ary random string
S = (s1, . . . , sN ) ∈ {0, . . . , l − 1}N .
3. Alice sends N particles |e1〉, . . . , |eN〉 to Bob.
4. Bob performs measurements on each received parti-
cle |ei〉 with the basisM(si) and records the result.
Open Phase
1. Alice reveals A to Bob.
2. Bob computes the codeword E(A).
3. Bob verifies the following condition for each particle
1 ≤ i ≤ N :
- If the basis that he chose is correct, i.e.,
|ei〉 ∈ M(si), he obtains |ei〉 as a result of
his measurement.
4. If the above condition does not hold for any i, Bob
rejects the commitment, otherwise, he accepts it.
C. Differences from Kent’s Protocols
As stated earlier, Bob does not need to preserve the
quantum state ρ until the open phase as he examines ρ
in the commitment phase. By using randomized bases, he
selects correct bases in a probabilistic way, and is there-
fore able to verify Alice’s commitment confidently.
In addition, players only need to be able to create
and detect D-dimensional quantum states, and thus the
highly entangled states, e.g., |hA〉 given in (6), are un-
necessary. For instance, the case of D = 2 can be imple-
mented using single-photons.
Error-correcting code is used here to ensure approxi-
mate orthogonality of states |ΨE(A)〉 as in Kent’s proto-
col (c.f., Eqn.(5)). Indeed in our protocol, Alice sends
|ΨE(A)〉 := |e1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |eN 〉, which satisfies
∀A∀A′ (A 6= A′ → ∣∣〈ΨE(A)|ΨE(A′)〉∣∣ < β¯d) . (11)
Here β¯ is the maximum value of the inner product of the
particle states defined in (8), i.e., |〈e|e′〉| ≤ β¯ for ∀e 6= e′
5(see also Paragraph IVB2 c). In the next section, we will
exploit this property to prove the binding condition.
IV. SECURITY EVALUATION
Now we will prove the security of the proposed scheme.
Throughout this section, we consider an ideal case with a
noiseless channel and error-free detection. (For non-ideal
cases, see Section V.)
As to what each player can do in quantum proto-
cols, we follow the definition given by Yao[14] and Lo-
Chau[15]. That is, quantum protocol is formalized in a
Hilbert space HT = HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HC, where HA (resp.
HB) refers to the space in which Alice (resp. Bob) can
operate. HC is the communication channel. Every step
of the protocol is done by unitary operations by Alice on
HA ⊗HC and those by Bob on HB ⊗HC, alternately.
A. Concealing condition
In the proposed protocol, n log2 q-bit data are encoded
in N log2D qubits. Thus, the number of bits accessi-
ble by Bob, m, satisfies m ≤ N log2D owing to the
Holevo bound. Hence, the protocol is concealing when
the bit number of A is greater than the qubit number, or
N logD < n log q.
B. Binding Condition
In the remainder of this section, we will prove the fol-
lowing theorem.
Theorem 2 The proposed protocol is binding in terms of
Definition 1.
1. Basic Idea of the Proof
The basic idea of the proof is the same as given in
Ref.[3]. Namely, we exploit the approximate orthogonal-
ity (11) of |ΨA〉 (see Eqn.(5) and the discussion nearby).
However, there is a complication, owing to the difference
in the form of the probability Pr[Ai|ρ]. In our protocol,
Pr[Ai|ρ] takes a different form, as the receiver performs
measurements on a randomly chosen orthogonal basis,
whereas in Kent’s protocol, the receiver can make use of
the string A unveiled by Alice.
a. Form of Pr[A|ρ]. The probability Pr[A|ρ] is given
as follows. First, for the sake of simplicity, suppose that
N = 1, that is, suppose that Alice sends only one parti-
cle. Then Bob chooses the correct basis for measurement
(satisfying e1(A) ∈M(s1)) with probability 1/l, in which
case he can confidently reject Alice’s commitment if the
outcome is different from |e1(A)〉. On the other hand,
if he chooses a wrong basis, he may accept Alice’s com-
mitment no matter what he obtains as a result of his
measurement. Thus, averaged over the random variable
S, the acceptance rate by Bob takes the form
PrN=1[A|ρ] :=
(
1− 1
l
)
+
1
l
〈e1|ρ|e1〉 = Trρπ(e1) , (12)
where
π(e) :=
(
1− 1
l
)
ID +
1
l
|e〉〈e|
=
(
1− 1
l
)
ID +
1
l
|i; j〉〈i; j| =: π(i; j) . (13)
Here ID is a unit matrix in HD.
Similarly for N > 1, i.e., if Alice sends more than one
particle, the acceptance rate takes the form
Pr[A|ρ] = TrρPE(A)
with
PE = π (e1)⊗ · · · ⊗ π (eN ) . (14)
b. What We Need to Prove. The sum of the accep-
tance rates for A1, . . . , Ar, which appears on the LHS of
(4), takes the form
∑
i
Pr[Ai|ρ] = Tr (ρQ) (15)
with
Q := PE(A1) + · · ·+ PE(Ar) . (16)
With this operator Q, what we need to do is to bound
TrρQ from above for an arbitrary density matrix ρ. How-
ever, it is obviously sufficient to consider instead the
upper bound on 〈Ψ|Q|Ψ〉 for an arbitrary pure state
|Ψ〉. Moreover, in order to avoid complications from
state normalizations, we do not require |Ψ〉 to be normal-
ized and instead discuss the upper bound of the quantity
〈Ψ|Q|Ψ〉/〈Ψ|Ψ〉.
2. Vector Subspace V (E(Ai))
In order to prove Theorem 2, it is convenient to di-
vide the DN -dimensional space HDN , which consists of
the degrees of freedom of the N particle used for com-
mitment. We here focus especially on the eigenvectors of
PE(Ai) with relatively large eigenvalues, as these vectors
contribute most to 〈Ψ|PE(Ai)|Ψ〉 included in 〈Ψ|Q|Ψ〉.
a. Eigenstates of operator PE. The eigenstate of PE
with eigenvalue 1, which is the largest, takes the form
|ΨE〉 := |e1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |eN 〉
= |i1; j1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |iN ; jN 〉 . (17)
6This becomes the state that Alice sends as her commit-
ment of the q-ary string A, if we let E = (e1, . . . , eN)
equal the codeword E(A) of A.
It is evident that all eigenvectors of PE , including |ΨE〉
take the form
|ΨE; ∆J〉 := |i1; j1+∆j1〉⊗ · · · ⊗ |iN ; jN +∆jN 〉 , (18)
since PE is a tensor product of the smaller operator
π(ei)’s defined in Eqn.(13), which act on particles. Here
∆J = (∆j1, . . . ,∆jN ) is an arbitrary D-ary string, and
the sum j+∆j appearing on the RHS of (18) is assumed
to be in modulo D. Recall that, as defined in (9), for
each i, the vectors |i; 0〉, . . . , |i;D− 1〉 form an orthonor-
mal basis in the internal D-dimensional vector space HD
of a particle. Hence, the states |ΨE ; ∆J〉 obviously form
a complete orthonormal basis of the vector space HDN
formed by N particles.
Roughly speaking, ∆J indicates the difference of
|ΨE ; ∆J〉 from |ΨE〉. The eigenvalue of |ΨE ; ∆J〉
decreases exponentially with the Hamming weight
HW (∆J), or the number of nonzero elements of the ∆J :
PE |ΨE ; ∆J〉 = (1− 1/l)HW (∆J)|ΨE ; ∆J〉 . (19)
For example, |ΨE〉 = |ΨE ; ∆J〉 for ∆J = 0.
b. Vector subspace V (E(Ai)). Then we define
V (E(Ai)) as a vector subspace of HDN , generated by
eigenvectors |ΨE(Ai); ∆J〉 with HW (∆J) < α. The con-
stant α here is an integer that determines the size of
the subspace and is supposed to satisfy 0 < α < d (see
Fig.2). That is to say, any vector |Γi〉 ∈ V (E(Ai)) can
be expanded as
|Γi〉 =
∑
{∆J | HW (∆J)<α}
wi,∆J |ΨE(Ai); ∆J〉 (20)
The appropriate value of α will be discussed later.
c. V (E(Ai))’s are approximately orthogonal. In fact
the subspaces V (E(Ai))’s with different values of i are
approximately orthogonal to each other. Indeed, if
we pick two elements of vector basis |ΨE(Ai); ∆J〉 and
|ΨE(Aj); ∆J ′〉 from different subspaces, i.e., for i 6= j, we
have
∣∣〈ΨE(Ai); ∆J |ΨE(Aj); ∆J ′〉∣∣ < β¯d−α , (21)
where β¯ is the upper bound on the inner products of par-
ticle state |0〉, . . . , |q − 1〉 defined in (8). In other words,
β¯ := maxe6=e′ |〈e|e′〉| < 1.
Inequality (21) follows because when the two states ap-
pearing on the LHS are represented using particle states
as |ΨE(Ai); ∆J〉 = |e1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |en〉 and |ΨE(Aj); ∆J ′〉 =
|e′1〉⊗· · ·⊗|e′n〉, |ei〉 and |e′i〉 are different for at least d−α
values of i, owing to the minimum distance property of
classical error correcting code. This is the main reason
for introducing classical error-correcting code (see Fig.2).
3. Decomposition of |Ψ〉
a. Subspace V and V ⊥. Next we define another sub-
space
V = V (E(A1)) + · · ·+ V (E(Ar)) .
That is, any element of V is given by the sum of the
elements of V (E(A1)), . . . , V (E(Ar)). As can be seen
from the construction of V (E(Ai)), V is the subspace of
the quantum message space HDN which contributes by
far the most to 〈Ψ|Q|Ψ〉.
Then we decompose |Ψ〉 into V and V ⊥, where V ⊥
denotes the orthogonal complement of V .
|Ψ〉 := |ΨV 〉+ |Ψ⊥〉 =
∑
i
vi|Γi〉+ |Ψ⊥〉 , (22)
∑
i
|vi|2 = 1 (23)
with |Ψ〉 ∈ V , |Ψ⊥〉 ∈ V ⊥ and vi ∈ C. The state
|Γi〉 is assumed to belong to V (E(Ai)) and can thus
be expanded as in Eqn.(20). We also assume that each
|Γi〉 is normalized, i.e., the coefficients wi,∆J defined in
Eqn.(20) satisfy
∑
{∆J | HW (∆J)<α}
|wi,∆J |2 = 1 .
On the other hand, we do not require |Ψ⊥〉 to be normal-
ized. Furthermore, |ΨV 〉 is not a unit vector in general,
although the coefficient vi’s is normalized as in Eqn.(23).
This is because |Γi〉’s with different values of i are not
exactly orthogonal as discussed above. It should also be
noted that there is arbitrariness in the choice of |Γi〉 ow-
ing to this non-orthonognality.
It is still obvious that any vector |Ψ〉 ∈ HDN can be
expanded as in Eqn.(22) with appropriate rescaling.
b. V ⊥ contributes only little. By definition, |Ψ⊥〉
satisfies 〈ΨV |Ψ⊥〉 = 0 for any |ΨV 〉 ∈ V , and it is ap-
parent that for any i, |Ψ⊥〉 ∈ [V (E(Ai))]⊥ (see Fig.2).
This means that |Ψ⊥〉 can be expanded by the eigenstates
|ΨE(Ai); ∆J〉 with Hamming weight HW (∆J) ≥ α.
Thus, it immediately follows that
∥∥PE(Ai)|Ψ⊥〉∥∥ ≤ (1−
1/l)α and we see that |Ψ⊥〉 contributes little to 〈Ψ|Q|Ψ〉
if α is sufficiently large. See Lemma 3 for a more rigorous
argument.
4. Outline of the proof, and lemmas
We have seen above that for large enough d and α
the subspace V (E(Ai))s are approximately orthogonal to
each other, and |Ψ⊥〉 ∈ V ⊥ contributes little to 〈Ψ|Q|Ψ〉.
Then, the following inequalities should hold:
〈Ψ|Q|Ψ〉 =
∑
i
〈Ψ|PE(Ai)|Ψ〉
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FIG. 2: A graphical image of vector spaces V and V ⊥.
V (E(Ai)) is the vector subspace generated by PE(Ai)’s eigen-
states with eigenvalues larger than (1− 1/l)α. Thus, the pa-
rameter α serves as the radius of each V (E(Ai)). Parameter
d denotes the separation between each V (E(Ai)). V is the
sum of all V (E(Ai))’s and V
⊥ is its orthogonal complement.
≃
∑
i
|vi|2〈Γi|PE(Ai)|Γi〉 ≤
∑
i
|vi|2 = 1 , (24)
〈Ψ|Ψ〉 = 〈ΨV |ΨV 〉+ 〈Ψ⊥|Ψ⊥〉 ≃
∑
i
|vi|2〈Γi|Γi〉 = 1 ,
(25)
which means 〈Ψ|Q|Ψ〉/〈Ψ|Ψ〉 ≃ 1.
In the subsequent subsection, we will use this idea to
prove Theorem 2 rigorously, but first we prepare two lem-
mas that are convenient. First we show that the contri-
bution of |Ψ⊥〉 is indeed small.
Lemma 3
For any i and s, (s ≥ 0, s ∈ Z),
〈Ψ⊥|{PE(Ai)}s|Ψ⊥〉 ≤ (1− 1/l)sα〈Ψ⊥|Ψ⊥〉 , (26)∥∥PE(Ai)|Ψ⊥〉∥∥ ≤ (1− 1/l)α ‖ |Ψ⊥〉‖ . (27)
Proof. (See also Paragraph IVB3 b and Fig.2.) As
|Ψ⊥〉 ∈ V ⊥ ⊂ [V (E(Ai)]⊥, |Ψ⊥〉 can be expanded
with the eigenstates |ΨE ; ∆J〉 with Hamming weight
HW (∆J) ≥ α. Note that if HW (∆J) ≥ α, from the
definition of π(e) given in Eqn.(13)
(PE)
s|ΨE ; ∆J〉 = (1− 1/l)sHW (∆J)|ΨE; ∆J〉 .
From this, Inequality (26) immediately follows. Inequal-
ity (27) can be shown by setting s = 2 in (26) as the
operator PE is Hermitian. ✷
Next we present the rigorous version of Inequality(24).
Lemma 4
〈ΨV |Q|ΨV 〉 ≤ 1 + r(r − 1)βd−αFα(N) , (28)
|〈ΨV |ΨV 〉 − 1| ≤ (r − 1)βd−αFα(N) , (29)
where,
Fα(N) :=
α−1∑
i=0
(
N
i
)
(D − 1)i .
Parameter β is defined among particle states |e〉, |e′〉 and
operater π(e′′), which acts on them:
β := max
¬(e=e′=e′′)
|〈e|π(e′′)|e′〉| < 1 . (30)
The maximum value of Eqn.(30) is evaluated under the
condition that the triplet e, e′, e′′ does not satisfy e = e′ =
e′′.
Proof.
Note
〈ΨV |Q|ΨV 〉 =
∑
i
|vi|2〈Γi|PE(Ai)|Γi〉 (31)
+
∑
{i,j,k|¬(i=j=k)}
v∗j vk〈Γj |PE(Ai)|Γk〉 .
The first term on the RHS is clearly less than or equal
to 1. The second term is the sum of the cross terms gen-
erated by vectors from different subspaces V (E(Ai))’s.
These should be negligible for a large enough d, since in
that case V (E(Ai))s are approximately orthogonal.
We will evaluate this second term exactly below. From
Eqn.(20), we have
〈Γj |PE(Ai)|Γk〉 (32)
=
∑
∆J,∆J′
w∗j,∆Jwk,∆J 〈ΨE(Aj); ∆J |PE(Ai)|ΨE(Ak); ∆J ′〉 .
The term appearing on the RHS can be bounded from
above as∣∣〈ΨE(Aj); ∆J |PE(Ai)|ΨE(Ak); ∆J ′〉∣∣ ≤ βd−α ,
since the triplet i, j, k does not satisfy i = j = k. In ad-
dition, because the Hamming weight of ∆J is bounded
from above as HW (∆J) ≤ α, there are only Fα(n) pat-
terns of wk,∆J (and equivalently for wj,∆J ). Thus, max-
imizing the RHS of Eqn.(32) using the Lagrange multi-
plier for wj,∆J and wk,∆J′ , we find
|〈Γj |PE(Ai)|Γk〉| ≤ Fα(N)βd−α .
Applying the Lagrange multiplier again on vi, we obtain
an upper bound for the second term on the RHS of (31),
and Inequality (28) can be proved. Inequality (29) can
be proved as well in a similar manner if one notices that
maxe6=e′ |〈e|e′〉| = β¯ ≤ β. ✷
5. Proof of Theorem 2
From the above two lemmas
〈Ψ|Q|Ψ〉
≤ 〈ΨV |Q|ΨV 〉+ 2|〈ΨV |Q|Ψ⊥〉|+ 〈Ψ⊥|Q|Ψ⊥〉
≤ 1 + r(r − 1)ǫ1 + 2r (1 + (r − 1)ǫ1) ǫ2S + rǫ2S2
8and
〈Ψ|Ψ〉 = 〈ΨV |ΨV 〉+ 〈Ψ⊥|Ψ⊥〉 ≥ 1− (r − 1)ǫ1 + S2 ,
where
ǫ1 = β
d−αFα(N) , ǫ2 = (1− 1/l)α , (33)
S = 〈Ψ⊥|Ψ⊥〉1/2 .
(c.f., Inequalities (24) and (25)), Thus,
∑
i
Pr[Ai|ρ] ≤ 〈Ψ|Q|Ψ〉〈Ψ|Ψ〉
≤ 1 + r
2ǫ1 + 2rǫ2(1 + rǫ1)S + rǫ2S
2
1− rǫ1 + S2
= rǫ2 +
1 + r2ǫ1 − rǫ2(1− rǫ1) + rǫ2(1 + rǫ1)S
1− rǫ1 + S2
=: rǫ2 +
c1 + c2S
c3 + S2
.
Assuming c1, c2, c3 > 0 and differentiating by S, we see
that
∑
i
Pr[Ai|ρ] ≤ rǫ2 + 1
2
√
c21 + c3c
2
2 + c1
c3
= 1 + ε . (34)
Here, as c1, c3 ≃ 1 and c2 can be chosen arbitrarily small,
ε on the RHS can be arbitrarily small. ✷
6. Choice of Parameters
Next, we show that ε given in (34) can actually be
arbitrarily small by choosing sufficiently large N . Here,
we do a very rough estimate without worrying about the
tightness of the bound. First assume rǫ1 ≤ 1/2 for ǫ1
defined in (33), then
√
c21 + c3c
2
2 + c1
c3
≤ (1 + 2rǫ1)(2c1 + c2) .
and immediately we have
∑
i
Pr[Ai|ρ] ≤ 1 + 4rǫ2 + 4r2ǫ1 . (35)
We will prove below that the second and the third term
on the RHS of Inequality (35) can be ≤ ε/2 respec-
tively. As to the second term, it suffices to let α =
log1−1/l
(
2−6ε/r
)
. As to the third term, first note
Fα(N) < (D − 1)α exp [N ·H2(α/N)] (36)
for N − α + 1 > N/D (see e.g., Ref.[12], Appendix A).
Using Inequality(36), we see that the third term on the
RHS of (35) can be bounded from above if
N ·H2
( α
N
)
+ d log β ≤ log
(
εβα
8r2(D − 1)α
)
. (37)
From a well-known theorem of the theory of error-
correcting codes, N can be made arbitrarily large while
keeping constant the information rate n′/N and the rel-
ative minimum distance d/N . The RHS of (37) being
a constant and log β being negative, Inequality (37) can
always be satisfied by choosing a large enough N .
V. NOTES FOR IMPLEMENTATION
As mentioned earlier, our protocol can be implemented
using currently available technology. For example, the
case of D = 2 can be realized by single photon sources
and detectors. Probably the most familiar way of en-
coding is the BB84-like states that are often used for
quantum key exchange[1],
|0〉 =
(
1
0
)
, |1〉 =
(
0
1
)
,
|2〉 = 1√
2
(
1
1
)
, |3〉 = 1√
2
( −1
1
)
,
which corresponds to q = 4, D = 2, l = 2, and β = 3/4.
As one can see from the theory of error-correcting codes,
for sufficiently large N , there exists a code E with the
information rate n′/N that is virtually equal to 1. Thus,
in this case, a secure protocol can be constructed with
m/n ≃ 1/2, where m is the bit number accessible by the
receiver before unveiling.
For example, take r = 210 and ǫ = 2−10, which cor-
respond to α ≥ 26. Then, it is guaranteed from the
Gilbert-Vershamov bound (see Ref.[12]) that there exists
a linear code with q = 4, N = 105, d/N = 10−2, and
n′/N ≥ 0.95, for which Inequality (37) holds. In this
case, m/n < 0.53 is satisfied.
It should be noted, however, that in real life there
are problems with information losses in optical channels
and with the detection rate of photon detectors. Conse-
quently, Bob might end up rejecting Alice’s commitment
even when an honest Alice has sent the correct commit-
ment |ΨA〉.
Still, we can overcome these problems by modifying
steps 3 and 4 of the open phase (Sec.III B) as follows.
First take an integer parameter t > 0, the exact value
of which is determined by the noise level of the channel
and the detection rate. Then change steps 3 and 4 of the
open phase as follows:
3. Bob verifies the following condition for each particle
1 ≤ i ≤ N :
- If the basis he chooses is correct, i.e., |ei〉 ∈
M(si), he obtains |ei〉 as a result of his mea-
surement.
Then, he records as y the number of particles that
do not satisfy the above condition.
4. If the above condition does not hold for more than
t particles, i.e., if y > t, then Bob rejects the com-
mitment. Otherwise he accepts it.
9In other words, Bob accepts Alice’s commitment even
when up to a certain number of particles does not meet
the condition of step 3. In this case too, the security of
the protocol can be shown in almost the same way as in
the previous section[13].
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a new QBSC protocol
and shown that it is secure in terms of the same secu-
rity requirements as discussed in Ref.[3]. Our protocol
has the merit that it can be implemented using currently
available technology such as single-photon sources and
detectors.
An example of future work is the optimization of the
protocol presented here. As discussed in Section V, if
the protocol is implemented using BB84-like states, the
classical error-correcting code E needs to be of the order
of N ≃ 105 in length. Although possible in principle, it
is not very practical to calculate a generator matrix of
this size using currently available computers. Instead, it
is much more worthwhile to optimize the protocol or the
security proof so that we can ensure the same level of
security for smaller N .
For example, the estimate given in Section IVB6 is
not yet tight, since there we were interested mainly in
proving that the protocol is in fact possible. Thus, by
using a better strategy, we might be able to obtain more
security for shorter bit length n. Note, in particular, that
even with the ratiom/n of the accessible bits being fixed,
there is a variety of choices of parameters, such as q, D,
and l. It will be interesting to see how we can better
optimize the protocol, whether by making better choices
for quantum states |0〉, . . . , |q − 1〉 or by optimizing the
classical error-correcting code E.
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